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NOTES AND COMMENTS
REGIONAL CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA
Dr. 'Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda*

This paper examines the efficacy of the regional integration arrangements in
southern and eastern Africa to regulate international finance from multinational
corporations to developing countries in that region. At the outset, it is important to
point out that in this paper the term international finance excludes other aspects of
international finance such as finance from multilateral agencies. Finance from
multilateral agencies could include international finance from the W orId Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. In our discussion, we shall confine the term
international finance to foreign direct investment in southern and eastern Africa.
Indeed, the study of multinational corporations (MNCs) as the primary channel for
transmitting foreign direct investment to developing countries has received increasing attention in the last two decades. As Nankani observes:
"The quest has been for an understanding of both the cause of FDI (foreign
direct investment), and the consequences (for home countries, host countries
and the international economic and political order) of its rapid growth."!
Regulation of foreign investment in developing countries can be viewed from
three angles. These viewpoints are regulation at the national level, regulation at the
regional level and regulation at the international level. The scope of discussion on
the topic is thus wide. However, in this paper, we concentrate on regulation of foreign
investment in Southern and Eastern Africa at the regional level. We also refer to the
position of states in the Southern and Eastern African region and demonstrate the
extent to which regional integration has been successful in regulating foreign
investment to these countries. It must be observed, however, that the control of
foreign investment at the regional level examines the interface of the international
political economy and international law on the one hand, and the efficacy of regional
policies on the other hand. To this extent, this paper also examines the regulation
*

LLB (Zambia), Gr.Oip, OMS, BCL(Oxford), MBA(Hull), OBA(Pacific Western), FCI, FRSA,
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in Southern and Eastern African states at the international

Against this background, it must be submitted that two important regional
integration schemes are examined in the paper. These schemes are the Common
Market For Eastern And Southern Africa and the Southern Africa Development
Community. Zambia, a State party to both the treaties establishing these two regional
integration schemes, is one of 'the countries that is examined in looking at the
efficacy of these regional integration schemes. Indeed, these schemes are the main
frameworks through which the Zambian government endeavours to regulate foreign
invesunent in the country at the regional level. We now examine the control of
foreign invesunent in the Southern and Eastern African region under the Common
Market For Eastern And Southern Africa Treaty. The regional integration scheme
established under this treaty is often referred to as COMESA.2

1.0 THE COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA:
COMESA was established on 5 November 1993 by a treaty done at Kampala,
Uganda.3 The States that are eligible to membership include Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Djibouti, Angola, Burundi, Comoros,
Seychelles, Somali and Zimbanwe.4 All of these states, except for the latter six, are
signatories to the treaty establishing COMESA.5 It is further provided in the
preamble to the treaty that:
"The following States of Eastern and Southern Africa may become Member
States of the Common Market upon fulfilling such conditions as may be
determined by the Authority: The Republic of Botswana; and The Republic of
South Africa (Post-Apartheid)."6

1.1. Background to the Setting of COMESA and the Objectives of COMESA:
It must be observed that COMES A has now replaced the Preferential Trade
Area (PTA), a regional integration scheme which had among its objectives, the
following agenda: to create trade within the Southern and Eastern Africa region (Le.
between Member States) and to divert trade away from the then apartheid South
Africa.
In order to provide an insightful and concise background to the establishment
of COMESA, we make reference to the following provision in Art. 2 of the treaty
for the establishment of COMESA:
2

The letters COMESA being the abbreviation of Common Market For Eastern And Southern Africa.

3
4

See, International Legal Materials Vo\. XXXI1I, No.5, September 1994, p. 1067.
Preamble of the treaty establishing COMESA in Ibid., p.1073.

5
6

Ibid., p. 1067.
Section 3 of the preamble of the COMESA Treaty.
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"Conscious of the overriding need to establish a Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa:
Bearing in
Preferential
towards the
Community

mind the establishment among their respective States of the
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States as a first step
creation of a Common Market and eventually of an Economic
for Eastern and Southern Africa;

Recalling the provisions of Art. 29 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States to the effect
that steps should be taken to develop the Preferential Trade Area established
by that Treaty into a Common Market and eventually into an Economic
Community ...
Determined to mark a new stage in the process of economic integration with
the establishment of a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and
the consolidation of their economic co-operation through the implementation
of common policies and programmes aimed at achieving sustainable growth
and development ...
Having regard to the principles of international law governing relations
between sovereign states, and the principles of liberty, fundamental freedoms
and the rule of law; and ..."
From the above paragraph, it is clear that COMESA is a follow up to PT A.
What has happened is that PT A has now been transformed into COMES A. Thus,
the process of economic integration under this regional integration scheme has now
progressed from a preferential trade area to a common market. Here, the integration
scheme is designed to have three phases. The first phase relates to the establishment
of a preferential trade area. This is followed by the conversion of this trade area into
a common market. Finally, the common market will then be converted into an
economic community. Although the COMES A Treaty provides that the regional
integration scheme under the treaty is divided in three phases, the treaty does not
distinguish a 'preferential trade area' from a 'common market' or from an 'economic
community'. Neither does the treaty distinguish a 'common market' from an 'economic community'. Art. 2 of the treaty for the establishment of COMES A (the
'COMESA Treaty') merely provides that 'Preferential Trade Area' means the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa established by Art. 1 of the
Treaty for the establishment of the PT A. This provision in the COMES A Treaty goes
on to provide that a Common Market means the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa established by Art. 1 of the COMESA Treaty itself. Even so, the
provisions referred to in Art. 2 of the COMES A Treaty do not provide definitions
of what constitutes a preferential trade area, a common market or an economic
community. Thus, the COMES A treaty does not draw any clear distinctions in
relation to the three phases of the COMESA regional integration scheme. What is
clear, however, is that the scheme is now moving from its first phase into its second
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phase.? PT A has been abolished and COMES A has been set up in its place. The third
phase of the regional integration scheme is thus seen to be the time at which
COMESA will be transformed into an economic community.
That said, it must be pointed out that Art. 3 of the treaty for the establishment
of COMESA provides that the following are the objectives of COMESA:
"The aims and objectives of the Common Market shall be: (a) to attain
sustainable growth and development of the Member States by promoting a
more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing
structure; (b) to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity
and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the
standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its
Member States; (c) to co-operate in the creation of an enabling environment
for foreign, cross border and domestic investment including the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development; (d)
to co-operate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among Member
States in order to enhance economic development in the region; (e) to cooperate in strengthening the relations between the Common Market and the rest
of the W orId and the adoption of common positions in international fora; and
(f) to contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realisation of the
objectives of the African Economic Community."8
Having provided the background to the establishment of COMES A and having
outlined the objectives of COMES A, the study now examines the organs of
COMES A.

1.1.2 Organs of COMESA:
Article 7 of the treaty for the establishment
following are the organs of COMESA:

of COMESA provides that the

"(a) the Authority; (b) the Council; (c) the Court of Justice, (d) the
Committee of Governors of Central Banks, (e) the Intergovernmental Committees;
(f) the Technical Committees; (g) the Secretariat; (h) the Consultative Committee."
We will now examine the COMESA organs listed above. In the main, the paper
examines two of these organs. These are the Authority and the Council. The two
organs are concerned respectively with policy formulation and policy recommendation. Having said that, it must be pointed out that the paper will also examine salient
features of the remaining organs of COMESA.
7

Id.

8

In Art. 2 of the COMESA treaty it is provided, inter alia, that the COMES A Treaty was inspired
by the treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community:

"Inspired by the objectives of the Treaty for the Establishment
nity and in cOll1pliance with the provisions

of the African Economic
of Art. 28(1) of the said Treaty."

Commu-
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The Authority, consisting of the Heads of state or Government of the Member
States, is the supreme policy organ of the Common Market and is responsible for
the general policy and direction and control of the performance of the executive
functions of the Common Market.9 Furthermore, the Authority is responsible for the
achievement of COMES A's aims and objectives.lo Indeed, the decisions of the
Authority are binding on the Member States and on all other organs of the Common
Market other than the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction.ll These decisions are
taken by consensusl2 and the Authority has powers to determine its own rules of
procedure.13
The Council of Ministers, on the other band, consists of sucb Ministers as may
be designated by each Member State.14 The Council is responsible for monitoring
and keeping under constant review and ensuring the proper functioning and development of the Common Market.15 It makes recommendations to the Authority on
matters of policy aimed at the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Common Market.16 The Council also gives directions to all other
subordinate organs of the Common Market other than the Court in the exercise of
its jurisdiction. 17With regard to powers of the Court, the Council may request the
Court to give advisory opinions on matters affecting the Council.18 Apart from the
functions outlined above, other important responsibilities of the Council include'
making recommendations to the Authority on the designation of Least Developed
Countriesl9 and designating economically depressed areas of the Common Market.2o
Like decisions of the Authority, decisions of the Council are binding on all Member
States, on all subordinate organs of COMESA other than the Court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.21 It must also be observed that as the case is with the Authority
decisions of the Council are taken by consensus.22 Furthermore, subject to any
directions that the Authority may give, the Council has power to determine its own
Rules of Procedure.23

9

Treaty for the establishment of COMESA, Art. 8(1).

10 Ibid., Art. 8(1).
11 Art. 8(3).
12 Art. 8(7).
13 Art. 8(6).
14 Art. 9(1).
15 Art. 9(2)(a).
16 Art. 9(2)(b).
17 Art. 9(2)(c).
18 Art. 9(2)(e).
19 Art. 9(2)(i).
20 Art. 9(2)(j).
21 Art. 9(3).
22 Art. 9(6).
23 Art. 9(5).
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On th<;other hand, whereas the Committee of Governors of central banks is
responsible for the development of programmes and action plans in the field of
finance and monetary co-operation,24 the Intergovernmental Committee is responsible for the development of programmes and action plans in all sectors of co-operation
except in the finance and monetary sector.25 COMES A also has a Secretariat headed
by a secretary-general.26 The secretary-general is appointed by the Authority and is
the chief executive officer of the Common Market.27
Chapter Five of the COMESA Treaty establishes the Court of Justice. It plays
the traditional role of a judiciary and adjudicates over claims by Common Market
employees and third-parties against the Common Market.28 Decisions of the Court
on the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty have precedence over decisions
of national courts.29

1.1.3. Undertakings and Duties of COMESA Member States:
In order to promote the achievement of the aims and objectives of COMES A
the Member States have made' specific undertakings to establish a customs union,
abolish all non-tariff b;miers to trade among themselves, establish a common
external tariff and to co-operate in customs procedures and activities. 3D The policy
bases of making these undertakings is' that there is need to liberalise trade in the
region and to promote customs co-operation.3! Other specific undertakings made by
COMESA Member States relate to transport and communications, industry and
energy, monetary affairs and finance, agriculture, and economic and social development. 32 Also, Member States recognise that dumping, by which products of a
Member State are introduced into the commerce of another Member State at less than
the normal value of the products, is to be prohibited if it causes or threatens material
injury to an 'established industry in the territory of the other Member State or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.33 Furthermore, Member
States have made general undertakings, first to abstain from any measures that are
likely to jeopardise the achiel,'ement of the aims and objectives of COMESA,34

24 Art. 13(2).
25 Art. 14(1)(2).
26 Art. 17.
27 Art. 17(2).
28 Art. 27.
29 Art. 29(2).
30 Art. 4(1)(a)J
31 Art. 4(1).
32 Art. 4(1)(2)(3)(4) and 4(5).
33 Art. 51.
34 Art. 5(1).
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secondly, to take steps to secure the enactment of and the continuation
legislation which gives effect to the COMESA Treaty.35

of such

The guiding principles upon which the aims and objectives of COMESA are
based and in pursuit of which the above undertakings have been made, are as
follows:36
(a)

equality and interdependence

of the Member States;

(b)

solidarity and collective self-reliance among the Member States;

(c)

inter-State co-operation, harmonisation
grammes among the Member States;

(d)

non-aggression

(e)

recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accor,
dance with the provisions of the Mrican Charter on Human Rights and Peoples'
Rights;

(1)

accountability,

(g)

the recognition and observance of the rule of law;

(h)

the promotion and sustenance of a democratic system of governance in each
Member State;

(i)

the maintenance of regional peace and stability through the promotion
strengthening of good neighbourliness; and

G)

the peaceful settlement of disputes among the Member States, the active cooperation between neighbouring countries and the promotion of a peaceful
environment as a pre-requisite for their economic development.

of policies and integration

of pro-

between the Member States;

economic justice and popular participation

in development;

and

Based on the above principles, Member States have agreed that any practice
which negates the objective offree and liberalised trade shall be prohibited.37 To this
end, the Member States have agreed to prohibit any agreement between undertakings
or concerted practice which has as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the Common Market (COMESA).38 A good
example of such practices would be subsidies granted by a Member State or through
state resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods.39 To realise the principle of equality
35 Art. 5(2).
j
36 Art. 6.
37 Art. 55(1).
38 Art. 55(2).
39 See Art. 52.
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and inter-dependence of Member States, these states have agreed to accord to one
another the 'most favoured nation treatment'.40 Art. 2 of the COMES A Treaty defines
'most favoured nation treatment' as:
"any advantage, favour, .privilege or immunity granted by any Member State
to any product originating in or destined for any third country and shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other Member States."
In observance of this 'most favoured nation treatment' postulate, Art. 56 of the
COMESA Treaty provides:
"Nothing in this Treaty shall prevent a Member State from maintaining or
entering into new preferential agreements with third countries provided such
agreements do not impede or frustrate the objectives of this Treaty and that any
advantage, concession, privilege and favour granted to a third country under
such agreements are extended to the Member States on a reciprocal basis.
Nothing in this Treaty shall prevent two or more Member States from entering
into new preferential agreements among themselves which aim at achieving the
objectives of the Common Market (COMES A), provided that any preferential
treatment accorded under such agreements is extended to the other Member States
on a reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis."
To ensure full observance of the 'most favoured nation clause', Member States
have agreed that they shall refrain from 'national treatment'.41 National treatment
could involve either enacting legislation or applying administrative measures which
directly or indirectly discriminate against the same or like products of other Member
States. Having examined the duties and undertakings of member states of COMES A,
we now turn to look at how far it can be argued that intemationallaw
concepts of
state sovereignty and a state's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources are
realisable concepts in southern and eastern Africa.

2.0

THE CONCEPTS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND A STATE'S
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS NATURAL RESOURCES:
Brownlie observes:
"The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional
doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal personality. If international law exists, then
the dynamics of state sovereignty can be expressed in terms of law, and, as
states are equal and have legal personality, sovereignty is in a major aspect a

40 Art. 56.
41 Art. 57.
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relation to other states (and to organisations of states) defined by law. The
principle corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are:
(1)

a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive,
population living there;

over a territory and the permanent

(2)

a duty of non-intervention
states; and

(3)

the dependence of obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the
consent of the obligator."42

in the area of exclusive jurisdiction

of the other

On the basis of this doctrine of state sovereignty, it is clear that every sovereign
state has the right, in international law, to promulgate policy on its internal state
matters and on its e~ternal state affairs. This right exists both in customary and
conventional international law. For example, in Art. 6 of the COMES A Treaty, the
customary international law right to state sovereignty is expressed subtly as the
principle of 'equality and interdependence of the Member States.'
To illustrate further, in pursuance of the doctrine of state sovereignty the
Zambian government has enacted legislation43 and promulgated policy on foreign
investment in that country. I have examined these issues elsewhere.44 The crucial
point to note, however, is that the doctrine of state sovereignty may conflict with
the need to maintain a fair balance between interests of the cOMESA Member
States. Various States could have different ideologies and could be pursuing
different economic policies. For example, whilst Zambia has recently reverted45 to
the accommodation development strategy, other Member States of COMES A such
as Malawi have always retained the accommodation development strategy so as to
provide better terms of attracting foreign investment to these countries. Kenya, like
Zambia, has shifted its national policy stance from the re-organisation development
strategy to the accommodation development strategy. In both these countries there
has been a deliberate effort to enact legislation offering generous fiscal incentives.
These incentives are targeted at attracting foreign investment to the countries
offering the incentives. Here, the pursuit of different national goals inevitably erodes
the idea of regional integration. This is one of the major shortcomings of regional
integration schemes such as the cOMESA scheme. The 'self-interest' agenda of most
of the COMES A Member States has increasingly become acute in the light of the
IMF and W orId Bank structural adjustment programme. Privatisation of state owned

42

l. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 {1990); See also, M. Akerhurst, A Modern
Introduction to International Law 143-147 at 155-167'(1990).

43

For example,

44

See, K.K. Mwenda, A Critical Review of Foreign Investment

the Securities Act, 1993, the Privatisation

Act, 1992 and the Investment

Stock Exchange and Privatisation (1995). Chapter Two.
45

Since the mid 1980's.

Act, 1993.

In Zambia: Direct Investment,

The
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business entities has been embarked on in most of the countries in the region. Small
stock markets have been set up in almost every country in the region. Pieces of
investment legislation providing generous fiscal incentives to foreign investors have
been enacted. These laws also provide guarantees against State expropriation of
private investors' assets. In several Member States of COMES A, including Zambia
and Kenya. the investment codes make provision for such incentives. What this
evidence shows is that harmonisation of, say, national fiscal policies in the region
will not be easy to achieve. The reason is simple. Intemationallaw
generally has a .
limited mechanism of State policing.46 In particular, the lack of a supranational
institution to enforce treaty obligations on Member States is a major shortcoming
of most regional integration schemes. The COMES A integration scheme is not free
from this problem. For example, Zambia's ambitious programme to privatise its state
owned enterprises did not arise out of the need to complement with any regional
integration scheme. It was (and is) a programme that was primarily targeted at
meeting interests of Zambia's international financiers. Thus, although it could be
argued that Zambia is asserting its right in international law, the right to state
sovereignty, when undertaking the privatisation programme (a programme that is a
component of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment prescriptions), there
is some difficulty in seeing how state sovereignty could be asserted when a state is
acting under conditions set by its international financier. By the very nature of
conditions being attached to Zambia's economic policies, the right to state sovereignty withers away. In the same vein, it is difficult to appreciate the practicality of
the doctrine of sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and
resources.47 Starke observes:
"If the (UN) Resolution signified that, in the absence of treaty limitations or
international law restrictions, a state was entitled to control the resources
within its territory, it would merely enunciate a truism. The real object of the
Resolution seems, however, to have been to encourage under-developed
countries to make use of their own resources, as a proper foundation for their
depletion by the action of other states."48
If, as Starke suggests, the real object of the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution of 21 December 1952 was to encourage under-developed countries to

46 See, J.G. Starke, Introduction to International LAw 3-18 (1989); A. Cassese, International LAw in
a Divided World 11-14,215-246 (1989); OJ. Harris, Cases And Materials On International LAw
1-17 (1991).
47 See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 21 December 1952, affirming the right of
peoples to freely use and exploit their natural wealth and resources. See also, Resolution No.
1803(XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1962 concerning Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resoun;es; M.A. Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources,
219-221 (1961).
48 Starke, supra n. pp. 125-126. The other question related to the issue of sovereignty of peoples and
national over their natural wealth and resources are the recent claims advanced fore the general
recognition of the 'right to development' of peoples (before self-determination), and of emancipated
territories.
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make use of their own resources, as a proper foundation for their independent
economic development, then the whole doctrine of sovereignty of peoples and
nations over their natural wealth and resources can no longer hold true for most
developing countries today. Independent economic development presupposes the
existence of 'stilte sovereignty'. However, as we have shown above, in the light of
the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment conditions, it is not realistic to
conceive the doctrine of sovereignty of peoples (in developing countries) and
nations (developing countries) over their natural wealth and resources.
3.0.

FACTORS
POLICIES

AFFECTING THE HARMONISATJON
OF COMESA MEMBER STATES:

OF NATIONAL

We have already identified and examined 'self-interest' goals, different ideologies in cOMESA Member States and the lack of a supra-national institution as some
of the important factors affecting the efficacy of the COMES A regional integration
scheme. As a result of these factors, it could be argued that COMES A Member States
such as Zambia. have not benefited much from this regional integration scheme in
as far as regulation of foreign investment in Zambia is concerned. In this section,
we will look at four important factors that affect efficacy of COMES A in regulating
foreign investment in the Southern and Eastern African region. These factors are
politics, economics, socio-cultural issues and technological factors.
Political factors that affect the efficacy of the cOMESA integration scheme
include some of the issues discussed above. That is, seeking self interests by Member
States could involve political agendas such as the retention of dictatorial One-party
Systems which do not allow principles of democratic government. Democracy is one
of the underlying features imbedded in the principles of the COMES A Treaty. Also,
ideological differences between Member States could lead to political problems.
On the other hand, economic factors that affect the efficacy of the cOMESA
integration scheme include differences in the balance of payment positions, differences in economic policies, the issue of convertibility and exchange rates relating to
the Member States' respective currencies and the general level of development of
the productive forces in each of the Member States. Socio-cultural factors include
problems over the choice and use of language (e.g. the use of Afrikaans in South
Africa), differences in national culture, differences in the literacy levels and
differences in the social stratification of various Member States. Technological
factors include differences in the advancement of each Member State's productive
forces (see also economic factors), problems of adaptability of technology to
industry in the Member States (e.g the issue of literacy levels and user-comprehension in management information systems), and the differences in choices between
capital intensive or labour intensive technology for the Member States.
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TO THE COMESA REGIONAL

This section of the paper looks at the Southern African Development Community,49 as a regional integration scheme posing threats to the realisation of COMES A
objectives under the COMESA integration scheme.
On August 17th 1992, Member States of the Southern African Development
Co-ordination Conference (SAOCC)50 signed a Treaty51 establishing the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), which replaced SADCC.52 The background to the SADC regional integration scheme is contained in the following note:
"As an international economic organisation, it will have legal personality in
each of the member State's territory (Art. 3) and its headquarters will be in
Gaborone, Botswana - seat of the current SADCC secretariat (Art. 2) ...
SADCC was instituted twelve years ago on April 1 1980 when the Heads of
State or Government of nine Southern African countries53 met in Lusaka,
Zambia to adopt a declaration - "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation", which formed the basis for the creation of the institution. Comprised of
loose association of states with a quasi-legal personality, its aim amongst
others, was to pursue policies to facilitate the economic development and
independence of these countries from South Africa, and to achieve the
integrated development of the region.
The dramatic changes that have taken place regionally54 and internationally, 55
together with the developments in South Africa with the dismantling of
statutory apartheid, and the unbanning of organisations such as the African
National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC), lead SADCC to

49 Established by the Treaty of the Southern African Development done at Windhoek. Namibia on
17 August 1992, reproduced in 32 ILM 116 (1993).
50 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swanziland, Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
51. As well as a Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa Development Community on
Immunities and Privileges. This Protocol confers the privileges and immunities on SADC institutions that are necessary for the proper performance of their functions, and are to be comparable
to those accorded to similar international organisations. The formalities for entry into force of this
Protocol are essentially the same as for the Treaty.
52 See, Art. 44.
53. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swansiland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
54 Thus the rapprochement reached in Angola between UNITA and the MPLA, the peace talks being
brokered between Renamo and Frelimo in Mozambique, and movements in the rest of Southern
Africa towards more democratic government, have contributed towards a positive view of the
economic gains to be achieved by integration.
55 The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the centrally-planned economies of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union.
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reconsider its position and its lack of progress in achieving its objectives. This
became particularly pressing with the prospect of an economically strong
democratic South Mrica joining the group. Listing several critical reasons56
for integrating Southern African economies, the (SADCC) report argued that
there was an absolute necessity for these governments (SADCC Member
States) to transform and restructure their economies to make them more
productive and competitive ... no single country in the region could make the
necessary change on their own. 'In these circumstances, closer economic cooperation and integration have become no longer merely desirable, but
imperative for growth, development and indeed survival.'
The treaty is seen as an important step towards the attainment of the goals. By
formalising what was previously a loose-knit group of states, the treaty gives SADC
the teeth it lacked as SADCC, thereby remedying what many considered to be a
major flaw in what was otherwise seen as a pragmatic approach to development. In
other words, it provides the Community (SADC) with the capacity to enforce
decisions taken by its supreme organ, the Summit of Heads of State or Government."57
In this section we have outlined the background to the setting up of SADC and
we have highlighted the objectives of SADC. We now draw distinctions between
SADC and COMESA.
5.0. DRA WING COMPARISONS

AND MAKING DISTINCTIONS:

We have already identified above the problem areas of regional control of
foreign investment in Zambia under the COMES A integration scheme. In that
discussion, we employed a PEST matrix58 in examining the problem areas. It must
be observed that as pointed out above, the SADC regional integration scheme poses
a threat to the efficacy of the COMESA regional integration scheme. There are
several areas of common interest between SADC and COMES A. It is such areas that
we propose to examine.
The treaty for the establishment of SADC emphasises the need to harmonise
political and socio-economic policies of SADC Member States.59 It is clear from our

56 Including the argument that political change in south Africa is likely to lead to new patterns of
investment in the region, with marked preference for South Africa because of its more attractive
investment climate, infrastructural development, and its managerial, technical and technological
capacities. A further argument looks to developments in the advanced industrialist countries, as
well as in the Pacific Rim and Latin America where these countries are entering into protectionist
trading blocs constructed to free trade zones. This has made integration even more crucial to enable
the countries of the region to strengthen their bargaining power with these trading blocs.
57 R.H. Thomas, "Introductory Note"in 32 ILM 116-117 (1993).
Politics, Economics, Soci'o-cultural and Technological factors.
59 Art. 5(2).
5.&
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discussion on COMES A objectives, that this SADC objective also obtains under the
treaty for the establishment of COMESA. However, the SADC Treaty goes further
by providing that the SADC integration scheme should achieve complementarity
between national and regional strategies and programmes.60 There is no emphasis
on complementarity in the COMES A Treaty, although chis treaty points out that
Member States should not take measures which frustrate objectives of the treaty.
It is clear that whilst the SADC Treaty is targeted at achieving development
goals in the region, the COMESA Treaty is akin to market growth in the region.61
This is evidenced by Art. 5(1) of the SADC Treaty which stipulates that one of the
objectives of the SADC regional integration scheme is: "to achieve development and
economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of
peoples of Southern Africa."
There is no such provision in the COMESA Treaty. Furthermore, it has been
established that the three phases of regional integration under the COMESA scheme
are not fully explained in the treaty. The COMES A Treaty simply states that from
a free trade area, the next stage is a common market before reaching the stage of an
economic community. No clear distinctions are drawn between the three stages.
Furthermore, the treaty does not stipulate the attributes of these stages.
It is interesting to note also that the COMES A Treaty does not make reference
to regulation of technology transfer or transfer pricing. On the other hand, the only
provision in the SADC Treaty on these matters relates to technology transfer. There
is nothing on transfer pricing in the SADC Treaty. The clause on technology transfer
establishes the general need to: " ... promote the development, transfer and mastery
of technology."62 Even so, the provision does not promulgate any policy guidelines
on the regulation of technology transfer. It simply puts across one of the objectives
of the SADC integration scheme.
Turning back to the COMES A Treaty, the major shortcoming of the COMESA
regional integration scheme lies in the fact that trade creation in a region, such as
Southern and Eastern Africa, which is mainly constituted by primary goods exporters, would not be an easy task to achieve. For example, how does Zambia export her
copper (raw materials) to Tanzania when Tanzania has no secondary industry to
process this copper into finished goods? Similarly, Zambia does not have secondary
industries to process sisal from Tanzania. Be that as it may, some countries in the
region are slightly more technologically advanced than others. Zimbabwe, for

60

Art. 5(1).

61

Although in the objectives of the COMES A Treaty (that have already been identified above) the
term development appears, it is clear from those objectives that the underlying feature behind those
objectives is development of the common market and not the multi-dimensional
development of
people(s) in the region.

62

The SADC Treaty, Art. 5(1).
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example, has a steel industry which gives it the potential for growth as an industrialised
country. On the other hand, countries such as Zambia have no steel industry.
It must be observed, however, that the primary idea behind these regional
integration scheme is that of synergy: 2 + 2 = 5. The European Union model for
regional integration seems to have been the basis on which COMES A was designed.
From a political point of view, the idea of regional integration may sound romantic.
The dynamics and mechanics of successfully implementing a regional integration
scheme are not a simple task. As has been demonstrated above under the PEST
matrix, there are several shortcomings of the COMES A regional integration scheme.
To reiterate, the problem of 'self-interest' of Member States - a problem which arose
under the Maastricht Treaty when Britain hesitated on the signing and ratification
of that treat - is one such shortcoming. Moreover, it is not easy to talk of synergy
in a situation where you have a divergence of power and authority. By this we mean
COMES A has its own interests to serve and SADC has its own interest too. At the
same time both bodies retain a similar group of countries for membership. Instead
of having one strong regional integration body in Southern and Eastern Africa, we
have this replication of regional integration schemes which could result in conflict
of interests between the two bodies. It could be argued further that the commitment
of Member States towards each of these two regional integration schemes is likely
to vary. Some states are likely to value SADC as a more development orientated
organisation than COMESA. All these differences serve to demonstrate the actual
and possible shortcomings of CQMESA as a regional integration scheme in Southern and Eastern Africa. To this extent, the paper has demonstrated the shortcomings
of regulating foreign investment in Southern and Eastern African States both at the
regional and at international levels.
6.0

CONCLUSION:

This paper has examined the COMESA and SADC regional integration
schemes in Southern and Eastern Africa as the two important frameworks through
which States in Southern and Eastern Africa endeavour to regulate foreign investment in their countries. The paper demonstrated the weaknesses of these regional
integration schemes in regulating foreign investment in countries such as Zambia.
It must be observed, however, that in examining issues of regional regulation of
foreign investment in Southern and Eastern Africa, the paper also examined aspects
of international regulation. Regional control of foreign investment is an integral part
of international regulation of foreign investment.
We observed that matters such as technology transfer and transfer pricing are
not regulated under the COMESA and the SADC Treaties. It is important at this
stage to propose that there is need for states in the Southern and Eastern African
region to promulgate policies on technology transfer to these countries. If national
development is the primary concern of these states, then the development strategies
and economic policies in these states must address the issues of viability and
adaptability to local conditions of the technology being transferred to Southern and
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Eastern Africa. On the other hand, bilateral agreements and treaties on transfer
pricing would be helpful in tackling the problem of transfer pricing. As pointed out
above, transfer pricing could involve group companies trading across international
borders.
In the final analysis, the extent to which regional treaty obligations crystallise
into customary international law will, to a large extent, provide new rules for
regulating foreign investment in Southern and Eastern Africa. Indeed, it is well
established in the field of public international law that the two fundamental requirements to constitute customary intemationallaw are State practice and opinio juris
(the conviction that the practice is one which is either required or allowed by
customary internationallaw).63 If the two requirements are met then new rules of
customary internalional law on regulalion of foreign investment in Southern and
Eastern Africa would emerge.

63 See, for example, R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law afThe Sea, 5-6 (1992). State practice
is often published, in the form of the texts of decrees of statutes, law reports, or volumes of
diplomatic correspondence.

